History

The turn of the century and millennium finds the world breaking free of the logic of the two world wars and the Cold War that dominated the twentieth century. New possibilities are emerging everywhere, some good and some bad. With so much change occurring, one might wonder whether history is still relevant to understanding the world. It is. The basic structures and principles of international relations, even in the current era, are deeply rooted in historical developments. Our discussion of these developments-necessarily only a series of brief sketches-begins with a long-term perspective and gradually focuses in on more recent history.

World Civilizations, 1000-2000

The present-day international system is the product of a particular civilization-Western civilization, centered in Europe. The international system as we know it developed among the European states of 300 to 500 years ago, was exported to the rest of the world over several centuries, and has in the last century subsumed virtually all of the world's territory into sovereign states. It is important to recognize the special importance of the European tradition to IR. It is also important to keep in mind that other civilizations existed in other world regions for centuries before Europeans ever arrived. These cultural traditions continue to exert an influence on IR, especially when the styles and expectations of these cultures come into play in international interactions.

North American students should note that much of the world differs from North America in this regard. Before Europeans arrived, native cultures in North America did not have extensive agriculture, cities, irrigation, armies, and the other trappings of civilization. Native cultures were exterminated or pushed aside by European settlers. Today's North American population is overwhelmingly descended from immigrants. In other regions, however, the European conquest followed many centuries of advanced civilization-more advanced than that of Europe in the case of China, India, Japan, the Middle East, and Central America. In most of the world (especially in Africa and Asia), European empires incorporated rather than pushed aside native populations. Today's populations are descended primarily from native inhabitants, not immigrants. These populations are therefore more strongly rooted in their own cultural traditions and history than are most Americans.

European civilization evolved from roots in the Eastern Mediterranean-Egypt, Mesopotamia (Iraq), and especially Greece. Of special importance for IR is the classical period of Greek city-states around 400 B.c., which exemplified some of the fundamental principles of interstate power politics. Thucydides's account of the Peloponnesian Wars between Athens and Sparta is still popular reading in IR. By that time states were carrying out sophisticated trade relations and warfare with each other in a broad swath of the world from the Mediterranean through India to East Asia. Much of this area came under Greek influence with the conquests of Alexander the Great (around 300 B.c.), then under the Roman Empire (around A.D. 1), and then under the Arab empire (around A.D. 600).

China remained an independent civilization during all this time. In the "warring states" period, at about the same time as the Greek city-states, sophisticated states (organized as territorial political units) first used warfare as an instrument of power politics. This is described in the classic work *The Art of War,* by Sun Tzu. By about A.D. 800, when Europe was in its "dark ages" and Arab civilization in its golden age, China under the T'ang dynasty was a highly advanced civilization quite independent of Western influence. Japan, strongly influenced by Chinese civilization, flowered on its own in the centuries leading up to the Shoguns (around A.D. 1200). Japan isolated itself from Western influence under the Tokugawa shogunate for several centuries, ending after 1850 when the Meiji restoration began Japanese industrialization and international trade. Latin America also had flourishing civilizations-the Mayans around A.D. 100 to 900 and the Aztecs and Incas around 120-independent of Western influence until conquered by Spain around 15W. In Africa, the great kingdoms flowered after about A.D. 1000 (as early as A.D. 6W in Ghana) and were highly developed when the European slave traders arrived on the scene around 1500.

The great Arab empire of about A.D. 600 to 1200 plays a special role in the international relations of the Middle East. Almost the whole of the region was once united in this empire, which arose and spread with the religion of Islam. European invasions the Crusades-were driven out. In the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, the eastern Mediterranean came under the Turkish-based Ottoman Empire, which gave relative autonomy to local cultures if they paid tribute. This history of empires continued to influence the region in the twentieth century. For example, *Pan-Arabism* (or Arab nationalism), especially strong in the 1950s and 1960s, saw the region as potentially one nation again, with a single religion, language, and identity. Iraq's Saddam Hussein in 1991 likened himself to the ruler who drove away Crusaders a thousand years ago. The strength of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the region today, as well as the emotions attached to the Arab-Israeli conflict, reflect the continuing importance of the historic Arab empire.

Europe itself began its rise to world dominance around 1500, after the Renaissance (when the Greek and Roman classics were rediscovered). The Italian city-states of the period also rediscovered the rules of interstate power politics, as described by an adviser to Renaissance princes named Niccolo Machiavelli. Feudal units began to merge into large territorial nation-states under single authoritarian rulers (monarchs). The military revolution of the period created the first modern annies." European monarchs put cannons on sailing ships and

began to "discover" the world. The development of the international system, of imperialism, of trade and war, were all greatly accelerated by the *Industrial Revolution* after about 1750. Ultimately the European conquest of the world brought about a single world civilization, albeit with regional variants and subcultures."

In recent decades, the world regions formerly dominated by Europe have gained independence, with their own sovereign states participating in the international system. Independence came earlier in the Americas (around 1800). In Latin America, most of the nineteenth century was absorbed with wars, border changes, the rise and fall of dictatorships and republics, a chronic foreign debt problem, revolutions, and recurrent military incursions by European powers and the United States to recover debts.

The Great-Power System, 1500-2000

The modem international system is often dated from the *Treaty of Westphalia* in 1648, which established the principles of independent, sovereign states that continue to shape the international system today. These rules of state relations did not, however, materialize at Westphalia from scratch; they took form in Europe in the sixteenth century. Key to this system was the ability of one state, or a coalition, to balance the power of another state so that it could not gobble up smaller units and create a universal empire (as had happened in China after the "warring states" period).

This power-balancing system placed special importance on the handful of great powers with strong military capabilities, global interests and outlooks, and intense interactions with each other. (Great powers are defined and discussed on pp. 87-89.) A system of great-power relations has existed since around A.D. 1500, and the structure and rules of that system have remained fairly stable through time, although the particular members change. The structure is a balance of power among the six or so most powerful states, which form and break alliances, fight wars, and make peace, letting no single state conquer the others.

The most powerful states in sixteenth-century Europe were Britain (England); France, Austria-Hungary, and Spain. The Ottoman Empire (Turkey) recurrently fought with the European powers, especially with Austria-Hungary. Today, that historical conflict between the (Islamic) Ottoman Empire and (Christian) Austria-Hungary is a source of ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia (the edge of the old Ottoman Empire).
Within Europe, Austria-Hungary and Spain were allied under control of the Hapsburg family, which also owned the territory of the Netherlands. The Hapsburg counties (which were Catholic) were defeated by mostly Protestant countries in northern Europe-France, Britain, Sweden, and the newly independent Netherlands-in the *Thirty Years' War* of 1618-1648. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia established the basic rules that have defined the international system ever since-the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states as equal and independent members of an international system. Since then, states defeated in war might be stripped of some territories but were generally allowed to continue as independent states rather than being subsumed into the Victorious state.

In the eighteenth century, the power of Britain increased as it industrialized, and Britain's great rival was France. Sweden, the Netherlands, and the Ottoman Empire all declined in power, but Russia and later Prussia (the forerunner of modern-day Germany) emerged as major players. In the *Napoleonic Wars* (1803-1815), which followed the French Revolution, France was defeated by a coalition of Britain, the Netherlands, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Russia, and Prussia. The *Congress of Vienna* (1815) ending that war reascerted the principles of state sovereignty in reaction to the challenges of the French Revolution and Napoleon's empire. In the *Concert of Europe* that dominated the following decades, the five most powerful states tried, with some success, to cooperate on major issues to prevent war-a possible precedent for today's UN Security Council. In this period, Britain became a balancer, joining alliances against whatever state emerged as the most powerful in Europe.

By the outset of the twentieth century, three new rising powers had appeared on the scene: the United States (which had become the world's largest economy), Japan, and Italy. The great-power system became globalized instead of European. Powerful states were industrializing, extending the scope of their world activities and the might of their militaries. After Prussia defeated Austria and France in wars, a larger Germany emerged to challenge Britain's position." In *World War* 1(1914-1918), Germany and Austria-Hungary were defeated by a coalition that included Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and the United States. After a 20-year lull, Germany, Italy, and Japan were defeated in *World War 11* (1939-1945) by a coalition of the United States, Britain, France, Russia (the Soviet Union), and China. Those five winners of World War II make up the permanent membership of today's UN Security Council.

After World War 11, the United States and the Soviet Union, which had been allies in the war against Germany, became adversaries for 40 years in the Cold War. Europe was split into rival blocs-East and West-with Germany itself split into two states. The rest of the world became contested terrain where each bloc tried to gain allies or influence, often by sponsoring opposing sides in regional and civil wars. The end of the Cold War around 1990, when the Soviet Union collapsed, returned the international system to a more cooperative arrangement of the great powers somewhat similar to the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century. However, new strains emerged among the European-American Japanese "allies" once they no longer faced a common threat from the Soviet Union?

Imperialism, 1500-2000

European imperialism (described more fully in Chapter 12) got its start in the fifteenth century with the development of oceangoing sailing ships in which a small crew could transport a sizable cargo over a long distance. Portugal pioneered the first voyages of exploration beyond Europe. Spain, France, and Britain soon followed. With superior military technology, Europeans gained control of coastal cities and of resupply outposts along major trade routes. Gradually this control extended further inland, first in Latin America, then in North America, and later throughout Asia and Africa.

In the sixteenth century, Spain and Portugal had extensive empires in Central America and Brazil, respectively. Britain and France had colonies in North America and the Caribbean. The imperialists bought slaves in Africa and shipped them to Mexico and Brazil, where they worked in tropical agriculture and in mining silver and gold. The wealth produced was exported to Europe, where monarchs used it to buy armies and build states.

These empires decimated native populations and cultures, causing immense suffering. Over time, the economies of colonies developed with the creation of basic transportation and communication infrastructure, factories, and so forth. But these economies were often molded to the needs of the colonizers, not the local populations.

Decolonization began with the British colonists in the United States who declared independence in 1776. Most of Latin America gained independence a few decades later. The new states in North America and Latin America were, of course, still run by the descendants of Europeans, to the disadvantage of Native Americans and African slaves.

Meanwhile, new colonies were still being acquired by Europe through the end of the nineteenth century, culminating in a scramble for colonies in Africa in the 1890s (resulting in arbitrary territorial divisions as competing European armies rushed inland from all sides). Latecomers such as Germany and Italy were frustrated to find few attractive territories remaining in the world when they tried to build overseas empires in the late nineteenth century. India became Britain's largest and most important colony in the nineteenth century. With possessions stretching from Africa to South Asia to Australia to Canada, Britain could boast that "the sun never sets on the British Empire." Ultimately, only a few non-European areas of the world retained their independence: Japan, most of China, Iran, Turkey, and a few other areas. Japan began building its own empire, as did the United States, at the end of the nineteenth century. China became weaker and its coastal regions fell under the domination, if not the formal control, of European powers.

In the wave of decolonization after World War II, it was not local colonists (as in the Americas) but native populations in Asia and Africa who won independence. Decolonization continued through the mid-1970s until almost no European colonies remained. Most of the newly independent states have faced tremendous challenges and difficulties in the postcolonial era. Because long-established economic patterns continue despite political independence, some refer to the postcolonial era as being *neocolonial.* Although the global North no longer imports slave labor from the South, it continues to rely on the South for cheap labor, for energy and minerals, and for the products of tropical agriculture. However, the North in turn makes vital contributions to the South in capital investment, technology transfer, and foreign assistance (see Chapter 13).

The collapse of the Soviet Union and its bloc, which reduced Russia to its size of a century earlier, can be seen as an extension of the post-World War II wave of decolonization and self-determination. There, as in much of the third world, imperialism has left ethnic conflict in its wake, as new political units come to terms with territorial divisions created in distant imperial capitals.

Nationalism, 1500-2000

Many people consider nationalism-devotion to the interests of one's nation-to be the most important force in world politics in the last two centuries. A nation is a population that shares an identity, usually including a language and culture. For instance, most of the 60 million inhabitants of France speak French, eat French cuisine, learned French history in school, and are represented (for better or worse) by the national government in Paris. But nationality is a difficult concept to define precisely. To some extent, the extension of political control over large territories like France created the commonality necessary for nationhood-states created nations. At the same time, however, the perceived existence of a nation has often led to the creation of a corresponding state as a people win sovereignty over their own affairs-nations created states.

Around A.D. 1500, countries such as France and Austria began to bring entire nations together into single states. These new nation-states were very large and powerful; they overran smaller neighbors. Over time, many small territorial units were conquered and incorporated into nation-states. Eventually the idea of nationalism itself became a powerful force and ultimately contributed to the disintegration of large, multinational states such as Austria-Hungary (in World War 1), the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia.

The principle *of self-determination* implies that people who identify as a nation should have the right to

form a state and exercise sovereignty over their affairs. Self-determination is a widely praised principle in international affairs today (not historically). But it is generally secondary to the principles of sovereignty (noninterference in other states' internal affairs) and territorial integrity, with which it frequently conflicts. Self-determination does not give groups the right to change international borders, even those imposed arbitrarily by colonialism, in order to unify a group with a common national identity. Generally, though not always, self-determination has been achieved by violence. When the borders of (perceived) nations do not match those of states, conflicts almost inevitably arise. Today such conflicts are widespread-in Northern Ireland, Quebec, Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tibet, and many other places.

The Netherlands helped to establish the principle of self-determination when it broke free of Spanish ownership around 1600 and set up a self-governing Dutch republic. The struggle over control of the Netherlands was a leading cause of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), and in that war states mobilized their populations for war in new ways. For instance, Sweden drafted one man out of ten for long-term military service, while the Netherlands used the wealth derived from global trade to finance a standing professional army.

This process of popular mobilization intensified greatly in the French 1Zevolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars, when France instituted a universal draft and a centrally nun "command" economy. Its motivated citizen armies, composed for the first time of Frenchmen rather than mercenaries, marched longer and faster. People participated in part because they were patriotic. Their nation-state embodied their aspirations, and brought them together in a common national identity.

The United States meanwhile had followed the example of the Netherlands by declaring independence from Britain in 1776. The U.S. nation held together in the Civil War of the 1860s and developed a surprisingly strong sense of nationalism, considering how large and diverse the country was. Latin American states gained independence early in the nineteenth century, and Germany and Italy unified their nations out of multiple political units (through war) later in that century.

Before World War I, socialist workers from different European countries had banded together as workers to fight for workers' rights. In that war, however, most abandoned such solidarity and instead fought for their own nation; nationalism proved a stronger force than socialism. Before World War II, nationalism helped Germany, Italy, and Japan to build political orders based on *fascism-an* extreme authoritarianism undergirded by national chauvinism. And in World War II it was nationalism and patriotism (not communism) that rallied the Soviet people to sacrifice by the millions to turn back Germany's invasion.

In the past 50 years, third world nations by the dozens have gained independence and statehood. Jews worked persistently in the first half of the twentieth century to create the state of Israel, and Palestinians have aspired in the second half to create a Palestinian state. While multinational states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have fragmented in recent years, ethnic and territorial units such as Ukraine and Slovenia have established themselves as independent nation-states. Others, such as Palestine and Kurdistan, are seeking to do so. The continuing influence of nationalism in today's world is evident. More than ever, it is a major factor in international conflict and war.

National identity is psychologically reinforced on a daily basis by symbols such as the national flag, by rituals such as the U.S. Pledge of Allegiance, and by other practices designed to reinforce the identification of a population with its nation and government. In truth, people have multiple identities, belonging to various circles fi7om their immediate family through their town, ethnic or religious group, nation or state, and humanity as a whole (see pp. 218-228). Nationalism has been remarkably successful in establishing national identity as a people's primary affiliation in much of the world. (In many places a sense of local affiliation remains important, however.)

Nationalism harnesses the energies of large populations based on their patriotic feelings toward their nation. The feeling of "we the people" is hard to sustain if the people are excluded from participating in their government. This participation is so important that even authoritarian governments often go through the motions of holding elections (with one candidate or party). Democracy can be a force for peace, constraining the power of state leaders to commit their nations to war. But popular influence over governments can also increase conflict with other nations, especially when ethnic tensions erupt.

Over time, democratic participation has broadened to more countries and more people within those countries (nonlandowners, women, etc.). The trend toward democracy seems to be continuing in most regions of the world in recent years-in Russia and Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Both nationalism and democracy remain great historical forces exerting strong influences in IR.

The World Economy, 1750-2000

In 1750, before the Industrial Revolution, the world's most advanced economy, Britain, had a GDP of about $1,200 per capita (in today's dollars). That is less than the present level of most of the global South. However, today Britain produces more than ten times that much per person (and with a much larger population than in 1750). This accomplishment was due to industrialization-the use of energy to drive machinery and the

accumulation of such machinery along with the products created by it. The Industrial Revolution started in Britain in the eighteenth century (notably with the inventions of a new steam engine in 1769, a mechanized thread-spinner in 1770, and the cotton gin in America in 1794). It was tied to Britain's emerging leadership role in the world economy (such as the cotton and textile trades). Industrialization process at the world level of analysis-spread to the other advanced economies.

By around 1850, the wooden sailing ships of earlier centuries had been replaced by larger and faster coal-powered iron steamships. Coal-fueled steam engines also drove factories producing textiles and other commodities. The great age of railroad building-of steam and steel-was taking off. These developments not only increased the volume of world production and trade, but also tied distant locations more closely together economically. The day trip across France by railroad contrasted with the same route a hundred years earlier, when it took three weeks to complete. In this period of mechanization, however, factory conditions were extremely harsh, especially for women and children operating machines.

Britain dominated world trade in this period. Because Britain's economy was the most technologically advanced in the world, its products were competitive worldwide. Thus British policy favored free trade. In addition to its central role in world trade, Britain served as the financial capital of the world, managing an increasingly complex world market in goods and services in the nineteenth century. The British currency, pounds sterling (silver), became the world standard. International monetary relations were still based on the value of precious metals, as they had been in the sixteenth century when Spain bought its armies with Mexican silver and gold.

By the outset of the twentieth century, however, the world's largest and most advanced economy was no longer Britain but the United States. The industrialization of the U.S. economy was fueled by territorial expansion throughout the nineteenth century, adding vast natural resources. The U.S. economy was attracting huge pools of immigrant labor from the poorer fringes of Europe as well. The United States led the world in converting from coal to oil and from horse-drawn transportation to motor vehicles. New technical innovations, from electricity to airplanes, also helped push the U.S. economy into a dominant world position. For instance, the telephone and light bulb were both invented in the United States in the late 1870s.

In the 1930s, the U.S. and world economies suffered a severe setback in the Great Depression. The protectionist Hawley-Smoot Act adopted by the United States in 1930, which imposed tariffs on imports, contributed to the severity of the depression by provoking retaliation and reducing world trade. Adopting the principles of *Keynesian economia,* the U.S. government used deficit spending to stimulate the economy, paying itself back from new wealth generated by economic recovery. The government role in the economy intensified during World War II.

Following World War II, the capitalist world economy was restructured under U.S. leadership. Today's international economic institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), date from this period. The United States provided massive assistance to resuscitate the Western European economies (through the Marshall Plan) as well as Japan's economy. World trade greatly expanded, and the world market became ever more closely woven together through air transportation and telecommunications. Electronics emerged as a new leading sector, and technological progress accelerated throughout the twentieth century.

Standing apart from this world capitalist economy in the years after World War II were the economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, organized on communist principles of central planning and state ownership. The Soviet economy had some notable successes in rapidly industrializing the country in the 1930s, surviving the German assault in the 1940s, and developing world-class aerospace and military production capability in the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviet Union launched the world's first satellite *(Sputnik)* in 1957, and in the early 1960s its leaders boasted that communist economies would outperform capitalist ones within decades. Instead, the Soviet bloc economies stagnated under the weight of bureaucracy, ideological rigidity, environmental destruction, corruption, and extremely high military spending. In the 1990s, the former Soviet republics and their Eastern European neighbors tried-with mixed success-to make a transition to some form of capitalist market economy, but found it difficult.

Today there is a single integrated world economy that almost no country can resist joining. At the same time, the imperfections and problems of that world economy are evident in the periodic crises and recessions of recent years-in Russia and Eastern Europe, Japan and other Asian economies, and even periodically the mature industrialized countries of North America and Western Europe. Above all, the emergence of 'a global capitalist economy has sharpened disparities between the richest and poorest world regions. While the United States enjoys unprecedented prosperity, Africa s increasing poverty has created a human catastrophe on a continental scale.

Just as the world economy climbed out of previous depressions in the 1890s and 1930s, it appears that a new wave of technological innovation is pulling the advanced industrialized countries, especially the United States, into a new phase of growth-possibly one that is more information-intensive and resource-efficient. Much less clear is whether technological change will bypass or empower the global South (see Chapters 12 and 13).

The Two World Wars, 1900-1950

World War 1 (1914-1918) and World War II (1939-1945) occupied only 10 years of the twentieth century. But *they* shaped the character of the century. Nothing like those wars has happened since, and they remain a key reference point for the world in which we live today. With perhaps just two other cases in history-the Thirty Years' War and the Napoleonic Wars-the two world wars were global or hegemonic wars in which almost all major states participated in an all-out struggle over the future of the international system.24

For many people, World War I symbolizes the tragic irrationality of war. It fascinates scholars of IR because it was a catastrophic war that seems unnecessary and perhaps even accidental (as some Cold War scholars imagined a nuclear war might be). After a century of relative peace, the great powers marched off to battle for no good reason. There was even a popular feeling that Europe would be uplifted and reinvigorated by a war-that young men could once again prove their manhood on the battlefield in a glorious adventure. Such ideas were soon crushed by the immense pain and evident pointlessness of the war.

The previous major war had been the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, when Germany executed a swift offensive using railroads to rush forces to the front. That war had ended quickly, decisively, and with a clear winner (Germany). People expected that a new war would follow the same pattern. All the great powers made plans for a quick railroad-borne offensive and rapid victory-what has been called the *cult of the ofensive*. Under these doctrines, one country's mobilization for war virtually forced its enemies to mobilize as well. The one to strike first would win, it was believed. Thus, when a Serbian nationalist assassinated Archduke Ferdinand of Austria in 1914 in Sarajevo, a minor crisis escalated and the mobilization plans pushed Europe to all-out war.

Contrary to expectations, the war was neither short nor decisive, and certainly not glorious. It bogged down in *trench warfare* along a fixed front-in the mud, under artillery bombardment, with occasional charges over the top into the enemy machine guns. For example, in 1917 at the Battle of Passchendaele (Belgium), the British in three months fired five tons of artillery shells per yard of front line, over an 11-mile-wide front, and then lost 400,000 men in a failed ground attack. The horrific conditions were worsened by chemical weapons and by the attempts of Britain and Germany to starve each other's population into surrender.

Russia was the first state to crumble. Revolution at home removed Russia from the war in 1917 (and led to the founding of the Soviet Union). But the entry of the United States into the war on the anti-German side that year quickly turned the tide. In the *Treaty of Versailles* of 1919, Germany was forced to give up territory, pay reparations, limit its future armaments, and admit guilt for the war. German resentment against the harsh terms of Versailles would contribute to Adolf Hitler's rise to power in the 1931k. After World War I, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson led the effort to create the League of Nations, a forerunner of today's UN. But the U.S. Senate would not approve U.S. participation, and the League did not prove effective. U.S. isolationism between the world wars, along with declining British power and Russia's withdrawal into revolution, left a power vacuum in world politics.

In the 1930s, Germany and Japan stepped into that vacuum, embarking on aggressive expansionism that ultimately led to the Second World War. Japan had already occupied Taiwan and Korea, after defeating China in 1895 and Russia in 1905. In World War I Japan gained some German colonies in Asia. In 1931, Japan occupied Manchuria (northeast China) and set up a puppet regime there. In 1937, Japan invaded the rest of China and began a brutal occupation that continues to haunt Chinese-Japanese relations. Japanese leaders planned a *coprosperity sphere* in which an industrialized Japan would control the natural resources of East and Southeast Asia.

In Europe, meanwhile, Nazi Germany under Hitler in the 1930s had rearmed, intervened to help fascists win the Spanish Civil War, and grabbed territory from its neighbors under the rationale of reuniting ethnic Germans in those territories with their homeland. Hitler learned from the weak response of the international community and League of Nations to aggression by fascist regimes in Italy and Spain. In an effort to appease German ambitions, Britain agreed in the Munich Agreement of 1938 to let Germany occupy part of Czechoslovakia. Appeasement has since had a negative connotation in IR, because the Munich Agreement seemed only to embolden Hider for further conquest.

In 1939, Germany invaded Poland, and Britain joined the war against Germany in response. Hitler signed a nonaggression pact with his archenemy Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union and threw his full army against France, occupying most of it quickly. Unlike World War I, the rapid offensive of mechanized armored units (tanks) worked this time for Germany. Hider then double-crossed Stalin and invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. This offensive ultimately bogged down and was turned back after several years. But the Soviet Union took the brunt of the German attack and suffered by far the greatest share of the 60 million deaths caused by World War II. This trauma continues to be a powerful memory that shapes views of IR in Russia and Eastern Europe.

The United States joined World War II against Germany in 1942. The U.S. economy produced critically important weapons and supplies for allied armies. The United States played an important role with Britain in the strategic bombing of German cities including the firebombing of Dresden in February 1945, which caused 100,000 civilian deaths. In 1944, after crossing the English Channel on June 6 (D Day), British-American forces

pushed into Germany from the west while the Soviets pushed from the east. A ruined Germany surrendered and was occupied by the allied powers.

At its peak, Nazi Germany and its allies occupied virtually all of Europe, except for Britain and part of Russia. Under its fanatical policies of racial purity, Germany rounded up and exterminated 6 million Jews and millions of others, including homosexuals, Gypsies, and communists. The mass murders, now known as the Holocaust, along with the sheer scale of war unleashed by Nazi aggression, are considered among the greatest *climes* against humanity in history. Responsible German officials faced justice in the *Nurrmberqt Tribunal* after the war (see pp. 333-340). The pledges of world leaders after that experience to "never again" allow genocide the systematic extermination of a racial or religious group-have been found wanting as genocide recurred in the post-Cold War era in Bosnia and Rwanda.

While the war in Europe was raging, Japan fought a war over control of Southeast Asia with the United States and its allies. Japan's expansionism in the 1930s had only underscored the dependence on foreign resources that it was intended to solve: the United States punished Japan by cutting off U.S. oil exports. Japan then destroyed much of the U.S. Navy in a surprise attack at *Pearl Harbor* (Hawaii) in 1941, and seized desired territories (including Indonesia, whose oil replaced that of the United States). The United States, however, built vast new military forces and retook a series of Pacific islands in subsequent *years.* The strategic bombing of Japanese cities by the United States culminated in the only historical use of nuclear weapons in war-the destruction of the cities of *Hiroshima* and Nagasaki in August 1945-which triggered Japan's quick surrender.

The lessons of the two world wars seem contradictory. From the failure of the Munich Agreement in 1938 to appease Hitler, many people have concluded that only a hard-line foreign policy with preparedness for war will deter aggression and prevent war. Yet in 1914 it was just such hard-line policies that apparently led Europe into a disastrous war, which might have been avoided by appeasement. Evidently the best policy would be sometimes harsh and at other times conciliatory, but IR scholars have not discovered a simple formula for choosing (see "The Causes of War" in Chapter 5).

The Cold War, 1945-1990

The United States and the Soviet Union became the two superpowers of the post-World War II era.' Each had its ideological mission (capitalist democracy versus communism), its networks of alliances and third world clients, and its deadly arsenal of nuclear weapons. Europe was divided, with massive military forces of the United States and its *North Atlantic 7ieaty Organization (NATO)* allies on one side and massive forces of the Soviet Union and its *Warsaw Pact* allies on the other. Germany itself was split, with three-quarters of the country-and three-quarters of the capital city of Berlin occupied by the United States, Britain, and France. The remainder, surrounding West Berlin, was occupied by the Soviet Union. Crises in Berlin in 1948 and 1961 led to armed confrontations but not war. In 1961, East Germany built the Berlin Wall separating East from West Berlin. It symbolized the division of Europe by what Winston Churchill had called the "iron curtain."

Despite the hostility of East-West relations during the Cold War, a relatively stable framework of relations emerged, and conflicts never escalated to all-out war. At Soviet-British meeting at *Yalta* in 1945 when the defeat of German was imminent, the Western powers acknowledged the fact of the Soviet army's presence in Eastern Europe, allowing that area to remain under Soviet influence. While the Soviet bloc did not join Western economic institutions such as the IMF, all the world's major states joined the UN. The United Nations (unlike the ill-fated League of Nations) managed to maintain almost universal membership and adherence to basic structures and rules throughout the Cold War era.

The central concern of the West during the Cold War was that the Soviet Union might gain control of Western Europe-either through outright invasion or through communists' taking power in war-weary and impoverished countries of Western Europe. This could have put the entire industrial base of the Eurasian landmass (from Europe to Siberia) under one state. The *Marshall Plan-U.S.* financial aid to rebuild European economies-responded to these fears, as did the creation of the NATO alliance. Half of the entire world's military spending was devoted to the European standoff: Much spending was also devoted to a superpower nuclear arms race, in which each superpower produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons (see pp. 285-289).

Through the policy of containment, adopted in the late 1940s, the United States sought to halt the expansion of Soviet influence globally on several levels at once-military, political, ideological, economic. The United States maintained an extensive network of military bases and alliances worldwide. Virtually all of U.S. foreign policy in subsequent decades, from foreign aid and technology transfer to military intervention and diplomacy, came to serve the goal of containment.

The *Chinese communist revolution* in 1949 led to a Sino-Soviet alliance *(Sino* means "Chinese"). But China became fiercely independent in the 1960s following the SinoSoviet split, when China opposed Soviet moves toward *peaceful coexistence* with the United States.' In the late 1960s, young radicals, opposed to both superpowers, ran China during the chaotic and destructive *Cultural Revolution.* But feeling threatened by Soviet power, China's leaders developed a growing affiliation with the United States during the 1970s, starting with a dramatic visit to China by U.S. President Nixon in 1972. This visit led to U.S.-Chinese diplomatic relations in

1979, and ended a decades long argument in the U.S. foreign policy establishment about "who lost China" to communism in 1949. During the Cold War, China generally tried to play a balancer role against whichever superpower seemed most threatening at the time.

In 1950, *the Korean War* broke out when communist North Korea attacked and overran most of U.S.-allied South Korea. The United States and its allies (under UN authority obtained after the Soviets walked out of the Security Council in protest) counterattacked and overran most of North Korea. China sent masses of "volunteers" to help North Korea, and the war bogged down near the original border until a 1953 truce ended the fighting. The Korean War hardened U.S. attitudes toward communism and set a negative tone for future East-West relations, especially for U.S.-Chinese relations in the 1950s. U.S. leaders considered using nuclear weapons during the Korean War, but decided not to do so.

The Cold War thawed temporarily after Stalin died in 1953. The first summit meeting between superpower leaders took place in Geneva in 1955. But the Soviet Union sent tanks to crush a popular uprising in Hungary in 1956 (an action it repeated in 1968 in Czechoslovakia), and the Soviet missile program that orbited *Sputnik* in 1957 alarmed the United States. The shooting down of a U.S. spy plane (the U-2) over the Soviet Union in 1960 scuttled a summit meeting between superpower leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Meanwhile in Cuba, after Fidel Castro's communist revolution in 1959, the United States attempted a counterrevolution in the botched 1961 *Bay of Pigs* invasion.

These hostilities culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the Soviet Union installed medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. The Soviet aims were to reduce the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear inferiority, to counter the deployment of U.S. missiles on Soviet borders in Turkey, and to deter another U.S. invasion of Cuba. U.S. leaders, however, considered the missiles threatening and provocative. As historical documents revealed years later, nuclear war was quite possible. Some U.S. policy makers favored military strikes before the missiles became operational, when in fact some nuclear weapons in Cuba were already operational and commanders were authorized to use them in the event of a U.S. attack." Instead, President John F. Kennedy imposed a naval blockade to force their removal. The Soviet Union backed down on the missiles, and the United States promised not to invade Cuba in the future. Leaders on both sides were shaken, however, by the possibility of nuclear war. They signed the *Limited Test Ban Treaty* in 1963, probibiting atmospheric nuclear tests, and began to cooperate in cultural exchanges, space exploration, aviation, and other areas.

The two superpowers often jockeyed for position in the third world, supporting proxy wars in which they typically supplied and advised opposing factions in civil wars. The alignments were often arbitrary. For instance, the United States backed the Ethiopian government and the Soviets backed next-door rival Somalia in the 1970s; when an Ethiopian revolution caused the new government to seek Soviet help, the United States switched to support Somalia instead.

One flaw of U.S. policy in the Cold War period was to see such regional conflicts through East-West lenses. Its preoccupation with communism led the United States to support unpopular pro-Western governments in a number of poor countries, nowhere more disastrously than in the *Vietnam War* in the 1960s. The war in Vietnam divided U.S. citizens and ultimately failed to prevent a communist takeover. The fall of South Vietnam in 1975 appeared to signal U.S. weakness, especially combined with U.S. setbacks in the Middle East-the 1973 Arab oil embargo against the United States and the 1979 overthrow of the U.S.-backed Shah of Iran by Islamic fundamentalists.

In this period of apparent U.S. weakness, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. But, like the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union could not suppress rebel armies supplied by the opposing superpower. The Soviets ultimately withdrew after almost a decade of war that considerably weakened the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, President Ronald Reagan built up U.S. military forces to record levels and supported rebel armies in the Soviet-allied states of Nicaragua and Angola (and one faction in Cambodia) as well as Afghanistan. Superpower relations slowly improved after Mikhail Gorbachev, a reformer, took power in the Soviet Union in 1985. But some of the third world battlegrounds (notably Afghanistan and Angola) continued to suffer from brutal civil wars (fought with leftover Cold War arms) into the new century.

In retrospect, it seems that both superpowers exaggerated Soviet strength. In the early years of the nuclear arms race, U.S. military superiority was absolute, especially in nuclear weapons. The Soviets managed to match the United States over time, from A bombs to H-bombs to multiple-warhead missiles. By the 1970s the Soviets had achieved strategic parity, meaning that neither side could prevent its own destruction in a nuclear war. But behind this military parity lay a Soviet Union lagging far behind the West in everything else-sheer wealth, technology, infrastructure, and citizen/worker motivation.

In June 1989, massive pro-democracy demonstrations in China's capital of Beijing (Tiananmen Square) were put down violently by the communist government. Hundreds or more were shot dead in the streets. Around 1990, as the Soviet Union stood by, one after another Eastern European country replaced its communist government under pressure of mass demonstrations. The toppling of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 symbolized the end of the Cold War division of Europe. Germany formally reunified in 1990. The Soviet leader, Gorbachev, allowed

these losses of external power (and more) in hopes of concentrating on Soviet domestic restructuring under his policies of *perestroika* (economic reform) and *glasnost* (openness in political discussion). In 1991, however, the Soviet Union itself broke apart. Russia and many of the other former republics struggled throughout the 1990s against economic and financial collapse, inflation, corruption, war, and military weakness, although they remained political democracies. China remained a communist, authoritarian government, but liberalized its economy and avoided military conflicts. In contrast to the Cold War era, China developed close ties with both the United States and Russia, and joined the world's liberal trading regime.

Scholars do not agree on the important question of why the Cold War ended. One view is that U.S. military strength under President Reagan forced the Soviet Union into bankruptcy as it tried to keep up in the arms race. A different position is that the Soviet Union suffered from internal stagnation over decades and ultimately imploded because of weaknesses in its system of governance that had little to do with external pressure. Indeed, some scholars think the Soviet Union might have fallen apart earlier without the United States as a foreign enemy to bolster the Soviet government's legitimacy with its own people.

The Early Post-Cold War Era, 1990-1999

The post-Cold War era began with a bang, while the Soviet Union was still disintegrating. In 1990, perhaps believing that the end of the Cold War had left a power vacuum in its region, Iraq occupied its neighbor Kuwait in an aggressive grab for control of Middle East oil. Western powers were alarmed-both about the example that such aggression could set in a new era, if unpunished, and about the direct threat to energy supplies for the world economy. The United States mobilized a coalition of the world's major countries (with almost no opposition) to oppose Iraq. Working through the UN, the U.S.-led coalition applied escalating sanctions against Iraq-from condemnation, to embargoing Iraq's oil exports, to threats and ultimatums. President Bush received from the U.S. Congress authorization to use force against Iraq.

When Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by the UN's deadline, the United States and its allies easily smashed Iraq's military and evicted its army from Kuwait in the *Gulfj War.* But the coalition did not occupy Iraq or overthrow its government. (Ironically, Saddam Hussein outlasted George Bush in office.) The costs of the Gulf War were shared among the participants in the coalition, with Britain and France making military commitments while Japan and Germany made substantial financial contributions. The pass-the-hat financing for this war was an innovation, one that worked fairly well.'

The final collapse of the Soviet Union followed only months after the Gulf War. The 15 republics of the Union-of which Russia under President Boris Yeltsin was just one-had begun taking power from a weakened central government, declaring themselves as sovereign states. This process, which is still working itself out, raised complex problems ranging from issues of national self-determination to the reallocation of property. The Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), which had been incorporated into the Soviet Union only in the 19405, were leaders in breaking away. The others held long negotiations under Gorbachev's leadership to restructure their confederation, with stronger republics and a weaker center.

The *Union Treaty* outlining this new structure provoked hard-liners in the old central government to try to seize control of the Soviet Union in a military coup in 1991.' The failure of the coup-and the prominent role of Russian President Yeltsin in opposing it-accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Communist party was banned, and soon both capitalism and democracy were adopted as the basis of the economies and political systems of the former Soviet states. (In reality, the daily workings of society change somewhat more slowly; the old guard tends to retain power wearing new hats.) The republics became independent states and formed a loose coordinating structure the **Commonwealth of Independent States** (CIS)-whose future, if any, is still unclear. Of the former Soviet republics, only the three small Baltic states are nonmembers. Russia and Belarus formed a quasi-union in 2000.

Western relations with Russia and the other republics were not trouble-free after 1991, and went downhill from there. Because of their own economic problems, and because of a sense that Russia needed internal reform more than external aid, Western countries provided only limited aid for the region's harsh economic transition, which had drastically reduced living standards. Russia's brutal suppression of its secessionist province of Chechnya in 1995 and 1999 provoked Western fears of an expansionist, aggressive Russian nationalism, especially after success of ultranationalists in Russian parliamentary elections earlier in the decade. Russian leaders feared that NATO expansion into Eastern Europe would place threatening Western military forces on Russia's borders, creating a new division of Europe. Russian President Yeltsin warned of a "Cold Peace." Meanwhile, Japan and Russia could not resolve a lingering, mostly symbolic, territorial dispute.

Despite these problems, the world's great powers overall increased their cooperation after the Cold War. Russia was accepted as the successor state to the Soviet Union and took its seat on the Security Council. Russia and the United States agreed to major reductions in their nuclear weapons, and carried them out in the 1990s.

U.S. leaders had hoped that the Gulf War would set valuable precedents for the future-the punishment of aggression, the reaffirmation of sovereignty and territorial integrity (of both Kuwait and Iraq), the utility of the UN Security Council, and the willingness of the United States to lead the post-Cold War order, which President

Bush named the "New World Order." The prime architect of the "New World Order" of the early 1990s was, in many ways, Franklin D. Roosevelt-the U.S. president during most of World War II in the 1940s. His vision was of a great power collaboration through a new United Nations after the defeat of Germany and Japan in the war. Included would be the winners of the war-the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain, along with France and (for the first time) China. The five would hold permanent seats on the UN Security Council. Germany and Japan would be reconstructed as democracies, and the United States would take a strong leadership role in world affairs. Roosevelt's vision was delayed by 40 years while the Soviet Union and United States contested the world order. But then, surprisingly, it came into existence in the early 1990s in something close to the original vision.

Hopes for a "New World Order" after the Gulf War quickly collided with less pleasant realities, however. Nowhere was this more evident than in Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter called Bosnia for short), where the UN came to have its largest peacekeeping mission and where the gap between the international community's words and deeds was most striking. Just after the Gulf War in 1991, the former Yugoslavia broke apart, with several of its republics declaring independence. Ethnic Serbs, who were minorities in Croatia and Bosnia, seized about a third of Croatia and two-thirds of Bosnia as territory to form a "Greater Serbia" with the neighboring republic of Serbia. In those territories, with help from Serbia, which controlled the Yugoslav army, the Serb forces massacred hundreds of thousands of non-Serb Bosnians and Croatians and expelled millions more, to create an ethnically pure state. Croatian militias in Bosnia emulated the tactics, though on a smaller scale.

The international community recognized the independence of Croatia and Bosnia, admitting them to the UN and passing dozens of Security Council resolutions to protect their territorial integrity and their civilian populations. But in contrast to the Gulf War, the great powers showed no willingness to bear-major costs to protect Bosnia. Instead they tried to contain the conflict by assuming a neutral role as peacekeeper and intermediary, offering a variety of peace plans, economic sanctions and rewards, and other inducements, none of which convinced Serb forces to withdraw from the territory they occupied. International "neutrality" included an arms embargo imposed on unarmed Bosnia and heavily armed Serbia alike, despite the UN resolutions declaring Serbia the aggressor. The UN sent almost 40,000 peacekeepers to Bosnia and Croatia, at a cost of more than $1 billion per year. NATO threatened military actions repeatedly, only to back down when costs appeared too high, as when Serb forces took peacekeepers hostage and threatened to kill them if NATO attacked.

By 1995, the international community's Bosnia policy was in shambles. The Serbian forces overran two of three UN-designated "safe areas" in eastern Bosnia, expelling the women and slaughtering thousands of the men, but then the tide of battle turned and Serb forces lost ground. Fears of a widening war, along with the pressures of an upcoming U.S. presidential election, finally triggered a more assertive international policy in Bosnia. Two weeks of NATO air strikes (the first serious use of Western military leverage in Bosnia) induced Serb forces to come to terms. U.S. negotiators pushed through the *Dayton Agreement,* which formally held Bosnia together as a single country, but granted Serb forces great autonomy on half of Bosnia's territory (the other half being controlled by a federation of Muslim, Croatian, and multiethnic parties). Sixty thousand heavily armed troops, mostly from NATO (with 20,000 from the United States), went to Bosnia and established a stable cease-fire. They limited their support for the "civilian" side of the Dayton Agreement, which included gnrarantees that refugees who had been "cleansed" could return home, that war criminals indicted by an international tribunal would be arrested, and that human rights and a free press would be respected. With these measures unimplemented, the international forces extended their mission year after year, fearing that withdrawal would spark renewal of the war. Although Bosnia's people have enjoyed a stable cease-fire, the war damaged the United Nations, the Western alliance, and the idea of collective security.

In contrast to their indecision early in the Bosnia crisis, the Western powers acted with dispatch in 1999 when Serbian forces carried out "ethnic cleansing" actions in the Serbian province of Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians made up 90 percent of the population. The guerrilla Kosovo Liberation Army had been conducting a violent campaign for independence, and Serbian forces had responded with massacres and the forced dis-placement of hundreds of thousands of Albanians. After a Western-sponsored peace initiative collapsed, NATO launched an air war against Serbia. The air campaign escalated incrementally over ten weeks as the Serbian government intensified its cleansing campaign in Kosovo. In response Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic was indicted for war crimes by the UN tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

NATO came under criticism-notably from Russia and China-for acting without explicit UN authorization and interfering in Serbia's internal affairs. (The international community and the UN considered Kosovo, unlike Bosnia, to be a part of Serbia.) Critics also faulted NATO for relying on air-only tactics in response to atrocities on the ground. Also, although smart bombs kept civilian casualties relatively low as compared with previous wars, mistakes in bombing killed dozens of Serbian civilians in several instances. NATO blamed a targeting error for its bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which triggered nationalistic anti-American demonstrations in China.

In the end, Milosevic abruptly conceded. Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo and were replaced by a UN-

authorized, NATO-led international force. Most refugees returned home, although much of the Serbian minority then fled Kosovo in the face of Albanian reprisals. The province's destiny remained unsettled as of early 2000. The debate about the limits of air war also remained unsettled, partly because Milosevic's capitulation may have been triggered not by the bombing but by a secret deal with Russia's military to partition Kosovo and retain a Serbian zone. At the end of the war, Russian troops based in Bosnia raced through Serbia and occupied the main airport in Kosovo before NATO troops arrived there. Planeloads of Russian combat troops took off for Kosovo, evidently to establish a Serbian-friendly Russian sector, but were turned back when Romania and Bulgaria, on U.S. urging, denied them airspace passage. The Russian military's bold actions, possibly taken without knowledge of civilian leaders in Moscow, brought it perilously close to combat with NATO, for the first time since the Cold War. However, the two sides negotiated an agreement to incorporate Russian forces into the international forces in Kosovo. The Kosovo episode nonetheless underscored fears that Russia was sliding towards disaster through a combination of political instability, economic collapse, rampant corruption and crime, an ailing President Yeltsin, and renewed war in secessionist Chechnya province.

Other Western military intervention decisions in the 1990s-outside the strategically important locations of the Persian Gulf and former Yugoslavia-do not easily map onto a "new world order." In Somalia, a U.S. led coalition sent tens of thousands of troops to suppress factional fighting and deliver relief supplies to a large population that was starving. However, when those forces were drawn into the fighting and sustained casualties, the United States abruptly pulled out, with the UN following by 1995." In Rwanda in 1994, a horrendous case of genocide-more than half a million civilians massacred in a matter of weeks-was virtually ignored by the international community. The great powers, burned by failures in Somalia and Bosnia, decided that their vital interests were not at stake. In 1997, the Rwanda conflict spilled into neighboring Zaire where rebels overthrew a corrupt dictator who had lost the Western backing he relied on during the Cold War (Zaire was renamed Democratic Congo). Neighboring countries were drawn into the fighting but the international community steered clear even as conditions worsened for the population. The U.S. military intervened in Haiti to restore the elected president, but the situation there remained bleak for years afterwards.

Yeltsin resigned at the end of 1999 and his designated successor, prime minister Vladimir Putin, took office and was elected president a few months later, while Putin's war against Chechen rebels was still popular with Russians. Despite the leadership change, Russian-American relations in 2000 faced the challenges of conflicting interests in multiple areas. Not only has the West provided precious little aid, in Russia's perspective, but it is pushing NATO's boundaries eastward. It is promoting new pipelines to bypass Russian territory in moving oil from former Soviet republics to Western consumers. It is criticizing the conduct of the war in Chechnya, a province of Russia, yet conducting its own military attacks around the world unilaterally when it so chooses.

The post-Cold War era may seem a conflict-prone period in which savage wars flare up with unexpected intensity around the world, in places like Bosnia and Rwanda. It is true that the era is complex and unpredictable, leaving some U.S. policy makers susceptible to Cold War nostalgia-longing for a time when world politics followed simpler rules based on a bipolar world order. Despite these new complexities, however, the *post Cold War era has been a more peaceful one.* World military spending has decreased by about one-third from its peak in the 1980s. Old wars have ended faster than new ones have begun. Latin America and Russia/Eastern Europe have nearly extinguished significant interstate war in their regions, joining a zone of peace already encompassing North America, Western Europe, Japan/Pacific, and China.

Warfare is diminishing worldwide but remains "hot" in an arc of conflict from Africa through the Middle East to South Asia. Even there, almost all wars in the 1990s were internal-even intense ones as in Afghanistan-rather than large-scale interstate wars. Long, bloody wars in South Africa and Mozambique are over. The Israel-Palestinian conflict has followed a zigzagging course toward peace. Although Afghanistan's war rages on, Cambodia's has nearly died out. Peace agreements ended long-standing wars in Guatemala and the Philippines. Even the war in Bosnia, which undermined world order in the early 1990s, has been frozen by the international community since late 1995. World order in the 1990s did not spiral out of control with rampant aggression or major war.

In international economic relations, the post-Cold War era is one of globalization. Countries worldwide are integrating into a world market, for better or worse. New hubs of economic growth are emerging, notably in parts of Asia that racked up remarkable economic growth in the 1990s (notwithstanding a sharp setback in 1997). At the same time, disparities between the rich and poor are growing, both globally and within individual countries (including the United States). Globalization has created backlashes among people who are adversely affected or who believe their identities are threatened by foreign influences. The resurgence of nationalism and ethnic-religious conflict occasionally in extremely brutal form-results partly from that backlash. So does the growing protest movement against world trade, which dominated the failed 1999 Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organization.

China is becoming more central to world politics as the twenty-first century begins. Its size and rapid growth make China a rising power-a situation that some scholars liken to Germany's rise a century earlier. Historically, such shifts in power relations have caused instability in the international system. China is the only

great power that is not a democracy. Its poor record on human rights-symbolized dramatically by the killing of hundreds of peaceful demonstrators in Tiananmen Square (Beijing) in 1989-makes it a frequent target of Western criticism from both governments and NGOs. With the transfer of Hong Kong from Britain in 1997, China acquired a valuable asset and turned to hopes of someday reintegrating Taiwan as well, under the Hong Kong formula o "one country, two systems." The issues of Taiwan and human rights are central to China's relations with the international community, but other issues matter as well: China holds (but seldom uses) veto power in the UN Security Council, and it has a credible nuclear arsenal. China adjoins several regional conflict areas (Korea, Southeast Asia, India, and Central Asia) and affects the global proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons. China is the only great power from the global South. Its population size and rapid industrialization from a low level make China a big factor in the future of global environmental trends such as global warming. All these elements make China an important actor in the coming decades of international relations. Western policy makers argue about whether a harsh policy of containment or a mild policy of engagement will best get China to cooperate on a range of issues such as trade, human rights, weapons sales, and intellectual property rights.

The post-Cold War era has barely begun. The transition into that era has been a turbulent time, full of international changes and new possibilities (both good and bad). It is likely, however, that basic rules and principles of IR-those that scholars have long struggled to understand-will continue to apply even though their contexts and outcomes may change in the new era that has begun to unfold. Most central to those rules and principles in traditional IR scholarship is the concept of power, to which we now turn.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

- IR affects daily life profoundly; we all participate in IR.
- IR is a field of political science, concerned mainly with explaining political outcomes in international security affairs and international political economy.
- Theories complement descriptive narratives in explaining international events and outcomes, but scholars do not agree on a single set of theories or methods to use in studying IR.
- States are the most important actors in IR; the international system is based on the sovereignty of (about 200) independent territorial states.
- States vary greatly in size of population and economy, from tiny rnicrostates to great powers.
- Nonstate actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) exert a growing influence on international relations.
- The revolution in information technologies, currently in full swing worldwidle, will profoundly reshape the capabilities and preferences of actors in IR, in ways that we do not yet understand.
- Four levels of analysis-individual, domestic, interstate, and global-suggest multiple explanations (operating simultaneously) for outcomes observed in IR.
- The global level of analysis~ recent addition-draws attention especially to technological change and the global gap in wealth between the industrialized North and the poor South.